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Abstract 
 
This paper estimates the impact of aggregate fluctuations on the time-varying trade 
policies of thirteen major emerging economies over 1989-2010; by 2010, these WTO 
member countries collectively accounted for 21 percent of world merchandise imports 
and 22 percent of world GDP. We examine determinants of carefully constructed, 
bilateral measures of new import restrictions on products arising through the temporary 
trade barrier (TTB) policies of antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties. We 
find evidence of a counter-cyclical relationship between macroeconomic shocks and new 
TTB import restrictions as well as an important role for fluctuations in bilateral real 
exchange rates. Furthermore, the trade policy responsiveness coinciding with WTO 
establishment in 1995 suggests a significant change relative to the pre-WTO period; i.e., 
new import restrictions became more counter-cyclical and sensitive to real exchange 
rate shocks over time. Finally, we also present results that explicitly address changes to 
the institutional environment facing these emerging economies as they joined the WTO 
and adopted disciplines to restrain their application of other trade policies such as 
applied import tariffs.  
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1 Introduction 
Why do countries sign trade agreements that restrict their use of import tariffs? A series of 
theoretical models dating back to Staiger and Tabellini (1987) and, more recently, Maggi and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1998, 2007),  suggest that a trade agreement can serve as a commitment device for 
governments that seek to enact a more liberal trade regime but which are plagued by time-
consistency problems. This theory is thought to be particularly relevant for many emerging 
economies, as these countries may not be sufficiently “large” in world markets so as to motivate use 
of trade agreements for the standard terms-of-trade reasons (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999).1 
Despite the strong theoretical predictions of the commitment literature, there is only limited 
empirical evidence on the explicit channels through which trade agreements facilitate different 
economic outcomes, let alone changes in policymaking behavior that might be associated with trade 
agreement commitments. Tang and Wei (2009) provide indirect support by using a difference-in-
difference approach to examine how trade and other reform commitments impact GDP growth and 
the aggregate investment to GDP ratio. Their finding that countries required to undertake more 
serious trade reform efforts in order to join the WTO enjoyed better economic outcomes is consistent 
with evidence that the WTO can help the time-consistency problem in tariff setting. Similarly, 
Subramanian and Wei (2007) have identified certain channels through which active participation in 
the multilateral trading regime has promoted trade growth. Their results challenge earlier studies 
such as Rose (2004) which finds little increased trade growth associated with the GATT/WTO system 
on average across countries.  
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate how a number of major emerging 
economies conducted their trade policy over 1989-2010 and, in particular, how the conduct of their 
trade policy changed by taking on commitments when joining the WTO in 1995. First, as we describe 
in further detail below, these economies exhibit variation in trade policy commitments across at least 
two important dimensions – (1) there is considerable cross-country variation in the share of products 
with any maximum tariff rate commitment, and (2) there is substantial cross-country variation in the 
simple average tariff rate over all products with any established maximum binding rate. Second, we 
describe how these economies have partially unwound their tariff commitments by resorting to a set 
                                                          
1
 Such countries may seek trade agreements for other reasons if, because they are “small” in world markets, 
they are not necessarily seeking partners against which to reciprocally neutralize the price impact of tariff cuts 
and coordinate policy changes so as to move jointly from the terms-of-trade driven prisoner’s dilemma 
outcome. 
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of potentially WTO-consistent policies that permit the imposition of “temporary” trade barriers if 
specific economic and legal criteria are met. Our results paint a complex picture of the nature of trade 
policy commitments that emerging economies have taken on during this period under the WTO. On 
one hand, the use of temporary trade barrier policies of antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing 
duties may signal evidence of these countries’ commitment to the WTO’s principles of transparency 
and stability in trade policy determination. On the other hand, the increasing use of such import 
restrictions may also signal a step back from the more fully liberal regime that they promised to 
employ by lowering and binding their more general applied most-favored-nation (MFN) import tariffs.   
Our particular approach is to examine the responsiveness of time-varying import protection 
to macroeconomic shocks for thirteen major emerging economies covering 1989-2010. We 
specifically investigate the imposition of new import protection through temporary trade barriers 
(TTBs) by constructing measures of import protection built up from disaggregated, product-level data. 
The emerging economies in our analysis are increasingly important contributors to the global 
economy; cumulatively by 2010, they combined to account for 21 percent of world merchandise 
imports and 22 percent of world GDP.2  Furthermore, the economic relevance of emerging economies’ 
application of TTBs in particular is increasingly apparent. Bown (2012a) documents that for the major 
Group of 20 (G20) emerging economies, the collective share of import products subject to TTB import 
restrictions increased more than 50 percent between 2007 and 2010 alone. 3 Finally, Bown (2011) 
finds that many of the G20 emerging economies also in our sample – including Argentina, Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey – have used TTBs over 1990-2009 in ways 
that rival the intensity (product coverage) and frequency (number of policies imposed and removed) 
of high income economies like the United States and European Union.4 
                                                          
2
 As we explain in more detail below, our sample only includes major users of these TTB policies of import 
protection. Our econometric approach exploits country-level fixed effects which themselves would capture non-
use by the countries omitted from our analysis if included. 
 
3
 See Bown (2012a, Table A1a) which updates the data originally presented as Table 3 of Bown (2011) through 
2011. Note that Mexico, Russia and Saudi Arabia are omitted from the G20 emerging economy sample for these 
statistics, though Mexico is included in the estimation sample described below. 
 
4
 A major difference, of course, is that the US and EU have a much longer history of accepting external 
enforcement of their trade policy commitments through the multilateral institutions, more binding trade policy 
commitments, and an experience with TTBs that dates back to at least the 1960s. The extensive research 
literature examining determinants of TTBs by high income economies is surveyed by Blonigen and Prusa (2003). 
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We begin our econometric investigation by documenting a general counter-cyclical 
relationship between macroeconomic growth and import protection for the period covering the 
inception of the WTO in 1995 through 2010. For these emerging economies, a decrease in domestic 
real GDP growth or an increase in the domestic unemployment rate leads to significantly more 
imported products subject to TTBs in the subsequent year. Furthermore, real appreciation of the 
bilateral exchange rate relative to a trading partner is also associated with subsequently more import 
restrictions, as is weak foreign GDP growth in a trading partner. The relationships for these emerging 
economies during this particular period are similar to those found in a sample of five high-income 
economies over the longer period of 1989-2010 (Bown and Crowley, 2013a).5  Nevertheless, these 
new results are particularly important in light of recent evidence from Rose (2013), which examines a 
number of other trade policy instruments (and a longer time series of data) and concludes that there 
has been a secular decline in the sensitivity of import protection across countries.6 Rose’s paper 
concludes that protectionism is no longer counter-cyclical; however, it does not specifically address 
the manner by which countries have engaged in inter-temporal substitution of trade policy away from 
applied import tariffs and toward instruments such as temporary trade barriers. 
The second half of our empirical analysis explicitly addresses the potential for trade policy 
substitution over time across instruments, and it also examines the role played by tariff commitments 
under the WTO beginning in 1995. Our formal approach is to extend our data sample back to 1989 
and to compare how these emerging economies conducted their trade policies under both the GATT 
(pre-1995) and WTO (1995 onwards) regimes. We provide evidence that the increased responsiveness 
of TTBs to macroeconomic fluctuations after 1995 represents a significant departure from how the 
major emerging economies used these trade policy instruments before 1995, suggesting an 
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 Bown and Crowley (2013a) examines data from the United States, European Union, Australia, Canada, and 
South Korea and is most closely related to a prior literature examining antidumping use by the United States and 
a handful of other high income countries on data from the 1980s and 1990s, including Knetter and Prusa (2003) 
and Feinberg (1989). One substantial difference is that while the current paper relies on the best available data 
across countries at the annual frequency, Bown and Crowley (2013a) was able to access data for high-income 
economies at the quarterly frequency. Another related paper is Crowley (2011), which is the first that we are 
aware of that highlights the channel of policy-imposing economies using country-specific bilateral import 
restrictions against trading partners that were experiencing negative growth shocks at home. Bown (2008) 
presents an approach that considers macroeconomic and industry-level determinants of antidumping for a 
number of the emerging economies in our sample for the period 1995-2002. 
 
6
 The evolving literature on import protection taking place during the Great Recession also includes Bussiere, 
Perez-Barreiro, Straub and Taglioni (2010), Kee, Neagu and Nicita (2013), Gawande, Hoekman, and Cue (2014), 
and Davis and Pelc (2012), in addition to Bown (2011). 
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institutional impact of the WTO. These results are robust to controlling for inter-temporal changes to 
WTO discipline over a country’s other trade policies, such as its applied MFN tariffs.   
In particular, we find that emerging economies implement TTB import protection during 
periods when a greater number of their imported products have become subject to the WTO 
disciplines that constrain a country’s ability to raise applied MFN tariff rates.7 Our empirical approach 
directly addresses the issue that emerging economy aggregate-level demand for TTBs might vary 
across countries and over time due to variation in the stringency of WTO discipline over their other 
trade policies. As we further describe below, this arises due to two important institutional differences 
between how high-income and emerging economies conducted their trade policy during this period. 
First consider applied import tariff levels. For any given year, most of the emerging economies in our 
sample had applied import tariffs that made them much less open to trade relative to high income 
economies – e.g., those studied in Bown and Crowley (2013a). Furthermore, many of these emerging 
economies also had lower applied tariffs in 2010 than at the beginning of the period.  Second, 
emerging economies differ from high income countries in that most retained some freedom to make 
WTO-consistent increases to their applied MFN import tariffs.  Our approach specifically controls for 
the time variation within and across countries in the extent to which WTO disciplines constrain an 
economy’s discretion to change its applied tariff rates.  
This evidence in particular, regarding the empirical relevance of the WTO and the role of 
economic incentives for trade policy formation in emerging economies, is consistent with results from 
an evolving literature that examines the extent to which economic incentives and economic shocks 
affect the trade policies of emerging economies, especially in light of these countries’ increasing 
engagement in the rules-based multilateral trading system. Recent evidence from emerging 
economies documenting the importance of economic determinants of trade policy formation pushes 
beyond traditionally political motives such as income redistribution or lobbying. Broda, Limão, and 
Weinstein (2008), for example, find that economic incentives affect non-cooperative tariff levels prior 
to a country’s WTO accession; their sample includes a number of emerging economies. Bagwell and 
Staiger (2011) similarly provide evidence that economic channels affect tariff reductions associated 
                                                          
7
 This cross-country evidence on the substitutability between applied MFN tariffs and use of TTBs is consistent 
with the micro-level results for India provided in Bown and Tovar (2011). That approach estimates a Grossman 
and Helpman (1994) model at the product level on repeated cross sections of data over 1990-2002 and 
concludes that many of India’s cuts to its applied import tariffs resulting from its unilateral liberalization of the 
1990s were subsequently unwound through the implementation of new TTBs such as antidumping and 
safeguards. 
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with WTO accession negotiations.  Our findings on TTBs also relate to a separate study on TTB use by 
the United States, in which Bown and Crowley (2013b) provide evidence that economic incentives at 
the sector level shape antidumping and safeguard use and thus US participation in cooperative, self-
enforcing trade agreements such as the WTO, an idea first formalized theoretically by Bagwell and 
Staiger (1990).  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical work 
regarding macroeconomic shocks and new import protection, and it characterizes the institutional 
environment facing emerging economies’ trade policies under the WTO during 1995-2010. Section 3 
introduces our empirical model and describes our panel dataset. Section 4 presents our baseline 
results regarding the relationship between macroeconomic fluctuations and new import restrictions 
for emerging economies under the WTO covering the years 1995-2010. In Section 5, we extend the 
data set back to 1989 where possible and compare emerging economy TTB use under the WTO 
relative to the prior GATT regime.  Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Theory, Institutional Environment, Empirical Model, and Data 
2.1 Theory  
An extensive empirical literature documents evidence of counter-cyclical trade policy in industrialized 
economies. Nevertheless, there are relatively few theoretical contributions that explicitly model the 
channels through which such import protection arises.8  Political economy models face two empirical 
difficulties: first, changes in political parameters do not necessarily match the speed of economic 
fluctuations; second, there is little evidence that the government’s preference for the welfare of 
import-competing sectors relative to consumers or export-oriented sectors rises during recessions.  
 Greater success in matching some of the stylized facts on time-varying trade restrictions 
comes from terms-of-trade-driven models of import protection. Consider first the approach of 
Bagwell and Staiger (1990); they present a dynamic, repeated-game model of the trade policy choices 
of two large countries that participate in a trade agreement. While global welfare is higher in such a 
framework when countries pursue a cooperative agreement that involves more liberal trade, 
                                                          
8
 See the extensive list of empirical research referenced in Bagwell and Staiger (2003), Rose (2013), and Bown 
and Crowley (2013a) for historical evidence. Irwin (2011, 2012) provides a recent analysis of the channels 
through which the shocks of the Great Depression are associated with the counter-cyclical increases in import 
protection of the 1930s. 
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unexpected increases to trade volumes result in the incentive to increase tariffs in order to take 
advantage of static (one-period) welfare gains. In the face of trade volume shocks, cooperative trade 
policy in a self-enforcing trade agreement can therefore be characterized by periods in which trade 
barriers increase.  In a related dynamic modeling framework, Bagwell and Staiger (2003) extend this 
basic approach by considering serially correlated shocks to growth in order to examine the 
relationship between other aggregate-level fluctuations and import protection.9 Counter-cyclical 
trade policy can arise in this environment because the terms-of-trade gain from a tariff increase – 
which is a response to a transitory increase in import volume – can exceed the long-run cost of a trade 
war in a persistent recession during which future growth is expected to be slow.  This model 
generates some of the key empirical predictions that we take to the data:  new import barriers are 
expected to arise when aggregate growth is weak at home and aggregate growth is weak in an 
important foreign source of imports.10   
 
2.2 The WTO, discipline over applied tariffs, and emerging economy trade policy formation 
Our investigation of the cyclicality of import protection for emerging economies covers 1989-2010, 
which is an important period of change in the institutional environment for the conduct of trade 
policy. However, we begin our empirical analysis with the post-1995 period during which the 
establishment of the WTO instituted a common set of international rules governing the application of 
TTB policies. Nevertheless, even when focusing on this particular period, there are important cross-
country differences that likely influence emerging economy application of TTBs. First, a number of 
these economies undertook substantial trade liberalization and made economically meaningful cuts 
to their applied MFN import tariffs that were unilateral in the sense that they were not required by 
the WTO. Second, a number of countries accepted WTO discipline over their tariff and other trade 
policies for the first time. These disciplines define maximum tariff rates at the product level that 
                                                          
9
 More formally, the Bagwell and Staiger (2003) set-up assumes two countries that trade many products with 
the aggregate growth rate in each country modeled as the rate of new product entry. A Markov-switching 
process moves the international economy from phases of high growth to low growth. Importantly, in each 
phase, trade volumes are subject to transitory shocks so that temporarily high import volumes can be observed 
during recessionary periods. 
 
10
 Crowley (2010) generates a similar prediction for the channel of weak trading partner growth by using a 
segmented markets model to show that antidumping import restrictions increase in response to weak foreign 
growth at the sector level. 
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countries promise not to exceed except through the use of WTO-permissible exceptions such as 
temporary trade barrier policies of antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties. Nevertheless, 
the binding nature of these disciplines may vary both across countries and within countries over time 
during this period, and any examination of the macroeconomic forces driving emerging economy 
trade policy must control for such variation.  
 Consider the data on different trade policy instruments in Table 1. The scope of a country’s 
tariff commitments under the WTO is most easily summarized through three measures – the share of 
the country’s total imported products at the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS-06) level that have a 
maximum tariff rate commitment, i.e., that are ``legally bound’’ (column 1), the simple average of the 
rates at which these tariffs are bound (column 2), and the difference between this legal binding tariff 
rate and the MFN applied tariff rate that the country implements over imports at the border (column 
2 less column 3 or 4). Table 1 indicates that, for these three measures, there is substantial 
heterogeneity across the thirteen emerging economies in our sample. The differential between the 
average applied MFN tariff rates in 1995 and 2010 (columns 3 and 4) also indicates variation within 
some of these countries over time; for some emerging economies, average applied MFN tariffs in 
2010 were higher than they were in 1995, while they are significantly lower in other economies. 
 Variation in applied tariff rates over the period suggests that an emerging economy’s 
aggregate-level demand for tariffs under the WTO’s TTB policies may change over time. When a 
country’s tariff commitments bind or almost bind, i.e. for imported products with applied MFN tariff 
rates that are at or close to the WTO maximum binding rate, then the only WTO-permitted option to 
implement additional import protection for that product is through a TTB. Columns (5) and (6) report 
data from Bown (2012a) on the stock of temporary tariff barriers as a share of all imported products 
in 1995 and in 2010, respectively. A comparison of the data in these two columns indicates that there 
is considerable differentiation both across countries, as well as within countries over time, as to the 
economic importance of the import coverage of these TTB policies. 
The complex interplay of broad trade liberalization commitments (as captured by WTO tariff 
bindings and applied tariff rates) and the potential unwinding of these commitments is summarized in 
the last three columns of Table 1. These columns provide two cuts of the data from imported 
products at the HS-06 level. For these three columns, we define an HS-06 product as “under WTO 
discipline” if it has an applied import tariff that is within 10 percentage points of its legally binding 
rate at the WTO; i.e., these are products for which governments have relatively little scope to further 
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increase their applied import tariffs.11 In other words, these are products with binding trade policy 
commitments.  
Column (8) of Table 1 presents, by country, the average over 1995-2010 of the share of all new 
TTBs per year for products that are “under WTO discipline.” For Argentina, 18.3 percent of the 
products over which it had used TTBs during 1995-2010 had applied tariffs that were within 10 
percentage points of the legal binding. The first implication of this column is that there is considerable 
variation across countries. China, South Africa and India use TTBs in products for which their ability to 
raise applied rates is largely constrained. On the other hand, smaller economies, such as Colombia 
and Thailand, impose TTBs on products for which there is considerable scope – i.e., more than 10 
percentage points for 100 percent of them – for applied tariff increases.  
The last two columns examine the relationship between WTO discipline over applied tariff rates 
and new TTBs.  For most countries in our sample, product categories that are under tight WTO 
discipline in year t-1 are more likely to face new TTBs in year t. For column (9) we construct the set of 
all TTBs that (1) did not have a TTB in place in year t-1 and that (2) faced a TTB in year t. We then 
calculate the fraction of these products that were under WTO discipline in year t. The reported 
statistic is the average of this fraction from 1995-2010. For column (10) we construct the set of 
products with (1) no TTB in place at time t-1 and (2) no TTB in place in year t.   We then calculate the 
share of products in this set that were under WTO discipline in year t.  The columns reveal that 
products that were under WTO discipline in year t-1 were more likely to face additional restrictions on 
imports in the following year. Again consider Argentina: a comparison of the data in columns (9) and 
(10) indicate that 20.2 percent of its products with new TTBs were constrained by WTO disciplines, 
whereas only 15.3 percent of TTB-unaffected products were constrained by WTO disciplines. With the 
exception of Turkey, this pattern is common across the G20 emerging economies; i.e., WTO disciplines 
which constrain other trade policy choices lead to disproportionately more new TTBs.  
                                                          
11
 For this exercise we consider 10 percentage points as opposed to, say, the applied tariff and binding rate 
being exactly equivalent; in the formal econometric analysis below we consider a number of different 
definitions. One motivation for using a slightly larger (10 percentage point) cutoff is given by the data on the size 
of TTBs applied as tariffs. Antidumping, for example, is frequently imposed as a new import duty at ad valorem 
rates of over 100 percent (Bown, 2012b). In practical terms, it may be costly for a government to change any 
tariff rate and thus it may only be willing to do so through the applied tariff rate at the border if it can raise its 
tariff legally by, say,  at least 10 percentage points; if not, it may choose a different policy instrument such as a 
TTB where the upper limit is less constrained. 
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This latter information in Table 1, regarding the relationship between TTBs and WTO 
commitments over applied tariffs, motivates our construction of an aggregate, time-varying indicator 
that we employ in the second half of our formal econometric analysis described below. We seek to 
capture the binding nature of the WTO disciplines over a country’s tariffs; we therefore begin by 
focusing on the share of a country’s products with applied tariff rates equal to the WTO legal binding. 
We then take annual differences of this variable, and we expect a positive relationship between it and 
the aggregate-level demand for new import protection through TTBs; i.e., an increase in the share of 
the country’s imported products that have applied tariffs equal to their legal binding rates would be 
associated with increased demand for TTBs the following year, ceteris paribus.   
Figure 1 plots the year-to-year change in the share of each country’s products with applied 
tariff rates equal to the WTO legal binding for the period 1996-2010. There is evidence of substantial 
variation – both over time and across countries – as to how constrained these emerging economies 
are by WTO disciplines over their applied import tariff policies. Argentina, India, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Thailand, for example, each have years for which there are major changes in the share of 
products falling under (or out of) WTO discipline. Given this anecdotal evidence of cross-country and 
inter-temporal variation in the binding nature of WTO disciplines over tariff policy for emerging 
economies, we explicitly control for the changing policy environment in our formal econometric 
analysis. We explore, for example, whether countries that are in a period with applied tariffs that are 
well below their legal bindings may be less likely to need to use TTB policies of import protection 
perhaps because they can raise their applied tariffs in response to shocks.  
We conclude this section by noting that the environment characterized by Table 1 and Figure 
1 for these emerging economies is quite distinct from that facing most of the high income economies 
studied in Bown and Crowley (2013a). For example, both the United States and European Union have 
bound 100 percent of their tariff lines under the WTO, and they have relatively low average bound 
tariff rates, at 3.6 percent and 4.2 percent, respectively. Furthermore, average applied MFN tariff 
rates for the US and EU are almost identical to their tariff bindings and they exhibit little time 
variation; i.e., these economies have little scope to raise applied MFN tariffs in response to economic 
shocks without violating WTO disciplines, and this is relatively time-invariant for 1995-2010. 
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3. Empirical model 
This section presents an empirical model of the aggregate-level determinants of import protection 
through the number of products that a government subjects to new temporary trade barrier 
investigations. The model relates the number of products under an antidumping, global safeguard, 
China safeguard, or countervailing duty investigation in a given year to the first lag of a number of 
macroeconomic variables.12 The general approach follows Bown and Crowley (2013a); we elaborate 
on the critical similarities and differences in more detail in the next section.   
The dependent variable is the number of products imported from country i against which the 
importing economy j initiates a temporary trade barrier investigation in year t that subsequently 
results in a new import restriction. This measure is a non-negative count and exhibits over-dispersion 
in that the variance of the number of investigations per time period exceeds the mean (see Table 2).  
We focus on products subject to investigations that ultimately result in the imposition of new import 
restrictions, though we do confirm the robustness of our results to other definitions.13 Unless 
expressly stated otherwise, in what follows we use temporary trade barriers and import protection 
interchangeably.  
We formally model temporary trade barrier formation as generated by a negative binomial 
distribution (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984). In this model, the number of imported products 
under temporary trade barrier import protection, yijt, follows a Poisson process after conditioning on 
the explanatory variables, xijt, and  unobserved heterogeneity, uijt>0.  Specifically,  
 
)),((~,| βijtxmijtuPoissonijtuijtxijty   , where  ),1(~ αgammauijt .  
 
Thus, the distribution of counts of products subject to new temporary trade barriers, yijt , given xijt 
follows a negative binomial with conditional mean and variance 
 
)exp(=),(=)|( βxβxmxyE ijtijtijtijt  and  
2))exp((+)exp(=)|( βxαβxxyVar ijtijtijtijt . 
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 Knetter and Prusa (2003)  introduced the use of a negative binomial model to estimate the responsiveness of 
trade policy to aggregate growth in their study of antidumping filings by four industrialized economies. 
 
13
 The qualitative nature of our results is robust to a redefinition of the dependent variable to be products 
subject to TTB investigations, including even those do not ultimately conclude with the imposition of trade 
barriers. This may be important given the Staiger and Wolak (1994) evidence for the United States, for example, 
that even a mere TTB investigation can have trade-destroying effects.  
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We use maximum likelihood to estimate the relationship between the number of products from 
country i that economy j subjects to policy investigations and import protection in year t as a function 
of the lag (year t-1) of the percent change in the bilateral real exchange rate, domestic and trading 
partner i real GDP growth, and bilateral import growth.  The model is identified off inter-temporal 
variation in domestic real GDP growth and off inter-temporal and cross-sectional variation in bilateral 
real exchange rates, foreign trading partner real GDP growth, and bilateral import growth.  
In interpreting the coefficient estimates from this model, we report incidence rate ratios 
(IRRs) for the explanatory variables. That is, we report the ratio of counts predicted by the model 
when the lag of an explanatory variable of interest is one unit above its mean value (and all other 
variables are at their means) to the counts predicted when all variables are at their means. To better 
quantify the results of our model, we also frequently present information on the percent change in 
the predicted counts of imported products becoming subject to new TTBs that our model generates in 
response to one standard deviation shocks to each of the explanatory variables of interest.  
 
3.1 Data and Variable Construction 
There are a number of similarities and differences in our data and modeling approach relative to our 
companion paper’s (Bown and Crowley, 2013a) estimates on high income economies that require 
explicit clarification and justification.  
Begin with the similarities. Like Bown and Crowley (2013a), we improve upon the prior 
literature through how we measure TTB import protection. We construct an annual time series of 
bilateral trade policy actions based on the universally-defined, 6-digit Harmonized System (HS-06) 
product level. The data for each policy-imposing economy begins either in 1989 or as soon as the 
country had TTB laws in place and available data on its use of TTBs (see Table 1, column 7). The data 
derive from extremely detailed trade policy information found in the World Bank’s Temporary Trade 
Barriers Database (Bown, 2012b). Our measure of import protection is comprised of four arguably 
substitutable temporary trade barrier policies – antidumping, global safeguards, China-specific 
safeguards, and countervailing duties.  Thus the dependent variable in our analysis is the count of HS-
06 imported products on which the government has agreed to initiate a new temporary trade barrier 
investigation against trading partner i in year t that results in import protection and against which 
there is not already an existing TTB in place. This count variable is carefully constructed for each 
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policy-imposing country by trading partner and by year in a conservative way that does not allow for 
redundancy.14 In robustness checks, we also construct this variable using the antidumping policy 
alone and using all (non-redundant) TTB investigations, even those that did not result in the 
imposition of new import restrictions.  
A second innovation relative to the prior literature is emphasis on a number of bilaterally-
defined explanatory variables which enable us to focus on relationships between a policy-imposing 
economy and its key trading partners.15 This is empirically relevant for two reasons. First, the 
temporary trade barriers under study can be imposed bilaterally so as to discriminate across import 
sources. Second, two of the key macroeconomic determinants of import protection in our model - 
trading partner i’s real GDP growth and the bilateral real exchange rate - vary bilaterally. Our dataset 
with bilateral variation also allows us to examine if countries apply import protection against trading 
partners facing their own economic shocks.  
There are three main differences in variable construction relative to the approach adopted in 
Bown and Crowley (2013a). The first distinction is this paper’s use of data at the annual frequency, a 
limitation that the companion paper is able to overcome because data at the quarterly frequency is 
available for only a smaller set of high income economies. Second, due to data limitations for a 
number of emerging economies, we generally use domestic real GDP growth to capture the slowdown 
of the economy, whereas the companion paper used either the change in domestic unemployment 
rate or real GDP growth. The unemployment rate data series is not sufficiently available for all of the 
emerging economies in our analysis to use in the baseline estimates; however, we do employ it where 
                                                          
14
 At any point in time in the sample period under the Harmonized System, there are roughly 5000 HS-06 
imported products that could be imported from any particular trading partner. In terms of policy, governments 
impose these import restrictions at the 8- or 10-digit product level; unfortunately the HS-06 level is the most 
finely disaggregated level of data that is comparable across countries. First, so as to avoid double counting in 
cases in which new import protection at the 8-digit level falls into the same HS-06 category as a previously 
imposed measure, we do not include such products. Second, for the more expansive import protection measure 
covering all four policies, we also do not include products that were subject to a simultaneous or previously 
imposed TTB under a different policy. This phenomenon is particularly relevant as most countervailing duties 
are imposed simultaneously with antidumping duties on the same products. For a discussion, see Bown (2011). 
 
15
 The Appendix lists the trading partners i for each of our thirteen policy-imposing economies. We condition on 
major trading partners affected by TTBs given that our estimation includes country fixed effects that would 
otherwise explain non-application against countries that a particular imposing country never targeted. 
Nevertheless, the trading partners included in our dataset are generally found to be the source of more than 
two thirds of the policy-imposing economies’ non-oil imports during the sample period, ranging from 65 percent 
for Thailand to 91 percent for Mexico. The Philippines is a notable outlier for which the available bilateral 
trading partners comprise only 38 percent of non-oil imports.  
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available in our sensitivity analysis. As we document below, here we also find strong results when we 
are able to utilize the unemployment measure.  
Third, and most importantly, the current paper also ultimately directly confronts the changing 
institutional and policy environment in which emerging economies employ TTBs during 1989-2010. As 
noted above, when we turn to examine the channels through which the WTO may be impacting TTB 
import protection, one of our key determinants is defined as the share of the country’s HS-06 tariff 
lines that are equal to its WTO legal binding, and we look at year-to-year changes in this variable. We 
expect a positive relationship between this determinant and the count of products subject to new 
TTBs; i.e., if the share of products with applied MFN tariffs equal to the WTO maximum binding tariff 
increases, then we expect aggregate-level demand for TTBs to increase, ceteris paribus.16 Note that 
while there is inter-temporal variation in this determinant, because both MFN applied rates and WTO 
tariff commitments are applied equally to all trading partners, there is no cross- trading partner 
variation within a given policy-imposing economy. Furthermore, the country-specific indicator 
variable that we employ in the estimation captures any time-invariant differences in the 
restrictiveness of WTO commitments across countries.17 In addition, when we compare trade policy 
formation under the WTO to policy formation during the GATT years, we interact indicator variables 
for the relevant trade agreement regime with the other determinants of interest.  
Finally, we estimate the negative binomial regression model of the contemporaneous (time 
t=0) count of imported products subject to new import protection, as a function of the value that 
these explanatory variables take on one year earlier, i.e., at time t=-1. Table 2 presents summary 
statistics for the data used in the empirical analysis, and the Appendix provides more information on 
the underlying sources of the data. 
 
                                                          
16
 Indeed, Bown and Crowley (2013a) consider the role of WTO disciplines for high income economies. While the 
estimated IRRs from that paper are in line with theoretical expectations, they are not precisely estimated. One 
explanation for the imprecision is the lack of inter-temporal and cross-sectional variation in WTO disciplines 
across the five high income economies during this sample period. 
 
17
 To clarify, we might also expect the level of a country’s WTO disciplines to impact TTB determination. I.e., 
policy-imposing countries that have bound less than 100 percent of their tariffs (see column 1 of Table 1) might 
be less likely to use TTBs than others because there is no WTO discipline over products with unbound tariffs. 
However, because there is no inter-temporal variation in the share of a country’s MFN tariffs that are bound 
during the WTO period, any level differences are captured by the importing country indicator variables. 
14 
 
 
 
4 Baseline Results for 1995-2010 
Table 3 presents results from our empirical model of temporary trade barriers (TTBs) for the full 
sample of thirteen emerging economies between 1995 and 2010. We begin with this period because a 
common set of rules governing TTB import restrictions came into force with the WTO establishment 
in 1995. We consider pre-1995 data in the next Section below.  
As is common practice for negative binomial regression models, we report estimates for 
incidence rate ratios (IRRs). An estimated IRR with a value that is statistically greater than 1 is 
evidence of a positive effect of the explanatory variable of interest, whereas a value statistically less 
than 1 is evidence of a negative effect. The table also reports t-statistics for whether the estimated 
IRR is statistically different from 1. Each explanatory variable – the bilateral real exchange rate, 
domestic real GDP growth, foreign real GDP growth, and bilateral import growth – is lagged one year.  
Our basic specifications include bilateral fixed effects for each importing–exporting economy pair to 
control for time-invariant, trading-partner-pair-specific heterogeneity in the application of new 
import protection through temporary trade barrier policies.  We also include a time trend in each 
specification. Finally, while the focus of our analysis is on use of all TTBs – antidumping, safeguards, 
and countervailing duties – we also include a specification that examines only the antidumping policy. 
Historically, antidumping has been the most frequently applied TTB in use by high income and 
emerging economies.  
 The first column of Table 3 indicates the results on the three macroeconomic variables – the 
percent change in the bilateral real exchange rate, domestic real GDP growth, and foreign real GDP 
growth – are similar to what has been observed for high income economies.  The IRR of 1.01 in the 
first row indicates an appreciation of the bilateral real exchange rate is associated with more TTBs 
against that particular partner in the following year. Import protection also reacts counter-cyclically to 
real GDP growth; a decline in both domestic and trading partner GDP growth is associated with more 
temporary trade barriers.  In particular, the IRR of 0.97 on growth in trading partner i means that 
import restrictions are targeted against trading partners experiencing relatively weaker growth in the 
previous period.  The IRR on bilateral import growth is just slightly greater than one (though it rounds 
down to 1.00) and is imprecisely estimated, indicating that changes in import growth have no effect 
on the number of temporary trade barriers. Finally, the IRR on the time trend is 1.02, indicating that 
import protection under these instruments is trending upward on average for this sample of countries 
over this period, though this is not statistically significant.   
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Before moving on to the other specifications in Table 3, we turn to an interpretation of the 
economic magnitudes of the results. Since understanding the size of effects is difficult when focusing 
on IRRs, Figure 2 presents additional information on the economic significance of the determinants of 
temporary new import protection. We begin by computing the model’s predicted estimates of 
temporary trade barriers for all observations in our estimation sample.  We then introduce a one 
standard deviation shock to each variable of interest at time t-1 and predict the count of temporary 
trade barriers at time t. Figure 2 illustrates the percent change in the mean number of HS-06 products 
subject to TTBs in response to the specified shock.  
Overall, Figure 2 indicates that the model predicts sizeable increases in the number of 
products subject to TTBs in response to the various macroeconomic shocks. Results from the baseline 
specification are quantified by the horizontally striped bars. Beginning with the left side of the figure, 
the first four bars quantify how a one standard deviation appreciation of the bilateral real exchange 
rate at t-1 impacts the number of products subject to new TTBs at time t. A one standard deviation 
appreciation (approximately 18 percent in our sample) increases the number of new TTBs by 18 
percent. The second group of four bars quantifies the impact of a domestic economic slowdown. A 
one standard deviation decrease in domestic real GDP growth (4.3 percent) leads to a 32 percent 
increase in the number of products subject to new import protection. Turning to the third group of 
bars in Figure 2, we see that weakness in a bilateral trading partner is also important;  a one standard 
deviation decrease in trading partner i’s real GDP growth (4.2 percent) is associated with a 16 percent 
increase in the number of temporary trade barriers it faces in the following year. Lastly, the fourth 
group of bars quantifies the impact of bilateral import growth. Although imprecisely estimated and 
not statistically different from one, the exact estimate on the IRR of 1.0006 implies that a one 
standard deviation in import growth would lead to a 6 percent increase in new TTBs.  
Returning to Table 3, we examine the robustness of our results. Column (2) of Table 3 
presents our first sensitivity analysis by substituting the change in the domestic unemployment rate at 
time t-1 for domestic real GDP growth as the measure of the health of the domestic economy. The 
results are broadly consistent with those reported in column (1). The IRR of 1.20 on the change in the 
domestic unemployment rate indicates that temporary trade barriers increase substantially in the 
year following an increase in unemployment. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, a one standard 
deviation increase in the change in the domestic unemployment rate leads to a 31 percent increase in 
the number of products subject to TTBs. Quantitatively, the results using this measure are almost the 
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same as that using real GDP growth. While the change in the domestic unemployment rate variable is 
the preferred measure of the domestic macroeconomic shock in the analysis of high-income 
economies of Bown and Crowley (2013a), the lack of good unemployment rate data for China and 
India in particular means that those countries are excluded from any analysis using the 
unemployment rate; furthermore, it shortens the available time series of data for other countries. For 
this reason, we generally emphasize the results which use real GDP growth as the measure of the 
domestic economy.  
Columns (3) through (7) demonstrate the robustness of our baseline estimates for 1995-2010 
to various other checks. Column (3) replaces the set of bilateral importer-exporter indicators with a 
set of importer indicators and a separate set of exporter indicators.  The IRRs for the variables of 
interest exhibit little qualitative change from the baseline specification. Nevertheless, this approach 
also allows us to report the IRR on the indicator that the trading partner is China. The estimated IRR of 
9.09 indicates that, controlling for other factors, China’s exporters are roughly nine times more likely 
than the omitted exporting country (defined as the median targeted exporter in the sample) to face 
import protection through TTBs.18  
In column (4), we omit bilateral import growth in order to examine the possibility that 
identifying foreign-induced shocks through inclusion of both foreign real GDP growth and import 
growth may be collinear. While omission of imports does increase the size of the effect for the 
estimated IRR on the foreign real GDP growth slightly, the estimated IRRs on the other variables of 
interest are virtually unchanged.  
Column (5) presents an alternative characterization of the dependent variable by narrowing it 
to consider only the bilateral count of products subject to the antidumping policy alone. Specifically, 
we redefine the dependent variable to be the bilateral count of products subject to new antidumping 
investigations that result in imposed import restrictions, thereby leaving out the other TTB policies of 
safeguards and countervailing duties. As Table 2 indicates, the count of products subject to new 
antidumping protection in a year is considerably smaller than that of all temporary trade barriers, 
averaging almost 1 fewer product per year per trading partner. Nevertheless, most of our key results 
in Table 3 continue to hold even when restricting attention to antidumping in isolation. In particular, 
the IRRs for the percent change in the bilateral real exchange rate and domestic real GDP growth are 
                                                          
18
 In this particular sample, the median targeted exporter was Australia, which cumulatively had 120 distinct 
HS06 product-importer combinations hit with new TTBs during this period, compared to 1446 HS06 product-
importer combinations for China’s exporters.  
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statistically different from one, and as Figure 2 indicates, the estimated size of negative real GDP 
growth shocks is even larger for antidumping alone than all TTBs jointly. One notable difference from 
the baseline results is that GDP growth in a foreign trading partner has no statistically significant 
impact on the number of products subject to antidumping. Finally, the general time trend across all of 
the countries in this sample is that antidumping alone is on average declining over 1995-2010.19 
Column (6) presents a still different approach to construction of the dependent variable 
whereby we broaden it (relative to the baseline) to include the count of all products subject to TTB 
investigations, including those that may not have resulted in the imposition of new import 
restrictions. The results are qualitatively unchanged according to the estimated IRRs and the 
magnitudes of the effects illustrated in Figure 2. If anything, TTB investigations alone (relative to 
imposed barriers of the baseline definition) appear slightly more responsive to domestic real GDP 
shocks and slightly less responsive to real exchange rate appreciations. Furthermore, the overall time 
trend of products subject to new investigations during this period is strongly increasing. 
Finally, column (7) of Table 3 presents the results from the empirical model of temporary 
trade barriers for an important subsample of emerging economies G20 members; i.e., Argentina, 
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey.20 The results for this set of countries 
are broadly similar to those for the larger sample of emerging economies.  
 
5 Investigating the Impact of the WTO on New Import Protection 
Thus far our estimates for the emerging economies’ use of TTBs have been undertaken on samples of 
data beginning in 1995. Our argument is that this is the period during which emerging economies 
faced a relatively common set of rules under the WTO regarding how to implement import protection 
through TTB policies. In this section we investigate empirically whether this new environment has 
affected how aggregate-level shocks feed into new import protection by identifying potential changes 
across time associated with the GATT versus WTO institutional regimes. We are able to do so because 
                                                          
19
 Bown (2012a) shows country-by-country evidence for which the overall increase in TTB import coverage over 
this period is due to inclusion of TTB policies such as safeguards. 
 
20
 Collectively, by 2010 these eight countries accounted for 18 percent of world merchandise imports and 20 
percent of world GDP. 
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a number of emerging economies had already established and were using TTB policies prior to 1995.21 
Here we exploit that information in order to shed additional light on the impact of the WTO 
institution by comparing emerging economy use of import protection through TTBs prior to 1995 with 
their use under the WTO period of 1995-2010.22  
 Furthermore, in this section we also introduce and examine the implications for the potential 
role of trade policy substitution taking place within a country over time due to WTO membership. As 
described in Section 2, when these countries joined the WTO, they committed to binding limits on 
their more generally applied MFN tariffs. As the share of a country’s products that are bound by those 
limits fluctuates over time – e.g., to the phase-in of scheduled trade liberalization commitments – 
there may be a change within a country regarding its need to access other forms of import protection 
such as TTBs in response to shocks. 
Table 4 presents our results. Column (1) takes our baseline model specification from Table 3, 
introduces a longer time series of data for TTB-using countries for which policy use prior to 1995 is 
available, and interacts each of the key determinants with an indicator for whether the year was 
during the GATT (1989-1994) or WTO (1995-2010) period. For each of the estimated IRRs, the table 
also reports the test statistic for whether there is a difference between the estimated IRR of the GATT 
and WTO periods. The evidence indicates a number of important channels through which aggregate-
level fluctuations differentially affect import protection through TTBs under the WTO relative to the 
GATT period. 
The first and direct effect of the change in the institutional environment is captured by the 
estimated IRR on the dummy variable for the WTO period. Specification (1) reports an IRR of 1.84 that 
is statistically different from 1 indicating that, controlling for a number of other factors, on average 
these countries use more TTBs under the WTO relative to the GATT.  
For real exchange rates, the estimated IRRs are significantly greater than 1 for the WTO 
period, indicating that appreciations are associated with subsequent increases in import protection. 
                                                          
21
 Table 1 documents the first year for which the sample begins for each policy-imposing economy, based on its 
initial use of TTBs during our sample period. 
 
22
 To be precise, our analysis does compare the period of WTO membership against the “pre-membership” 
period – and not the GATT period – for one of the countries in our sample. I.e., for China we consider 
differential impacts of its years as a WTO member (2002-2010) with its years of TTB use prior to joining the WTO 
(1997-2001). For all other countries in the sample we compare 1995-2010 with the pre-1995 period since all 
other countries in the sample joined the WTO in 1995. 
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However, this is also a statistically significant change relative to the impact of real exchange rate 
movements on TTB import protection during the GATT period. Over 1989-1994, real exchange rate 
depreciations (IRR of 0.99) were associated with new import protection. While the IRR for the 1989-
1994 period is imprecisely estimated, it is statistically different from the estimated IRR of 1.01 for the 
1995-2010 period. 
The second important result of specification (1) is that over the period 1995-2010, there is a 
strong counter-cyclical relationship between lagged domestic real GDP growth and new import 
protection. This is also distinct from the role this variable took on prior to the WTO; the estimated IRR 
for the 1989-1994 period is 1.05. While the estimated IRR on real GDP growth for the 1989-1994 
period is also imprecisely estimated, it is also statistically different from the estimated IRR of the 
1995-2010 period. 
One way to interpret these two pieces of evidence is that the inception of the WTO in 1995 
has coincided with a change in behavior as emerging economies began to respond to macroeconomic 
shocks by using new TTB import protection in the same way that high-income economies had been 
doing since at least the 1980s.23 The evidence suggests a significant change for these emerging 
economies relative to the pre-WTO period of 1989-1994, during which factors other than aggregate-
level shocks apparently led to new import protection under TTB policies. 
The results of the next two variables from column (1) are mixed. First, the estimated IRRs on 
lagged trading partner real GDP growth are statistically less than one in both periods. However, the 
estimated IRRs are statistically different from one another, and interestingly, the IRR from the GATT 
period is even further away from one than the IRR from the WTO period. This result suggests that 
import protection for these countries has become less responsive to negative foreign real GDP shocks 
after 1995. Some of this is explained by the relatively short sample of the pre-WTO period which 
happens to coincides with foreign recessions (or low growth periods) for significant trading partners 
(exporters), such as the United States and European Union.24 This is also partly explained by the 
composition of targeted trading partners in the post-1995 period shifting so dramatically toward 
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 See Bown and Crowley (2013a) as well as Knetter and  Prusa (2003). 
 
24
 This also technically holds for China for its “pre-WTO” use of TTBs which began in 1997 and yet its particular 
WTO membership period did not begin until the end of 2001 when its accession was implemented. During its 
particular pre-WTO period, its use of TTBs targeted important exporters like South Korea and Japan during the 
Asian financial crisis, as well as Russia during its crisis in 1999. 
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China, a trading partner with extremely strong (and relatively non-volatile) real GDP growth during 
this period.25 Second, while the estimated IRRs on bilateral import growth switch from being less than 
one (GATT period) to greater than one (WTO period), neither IRR is estimated as different from one 
and the test indicates that the estimates are not statistically different from one another. Thus there is 
only weak evidence that import protection through TTBs has become more sensitive to bilateral 
import growth surges under the WTO relative to the GATT. 
Column (2) of Table 4 presents our paper’s preferred specification whereby we modify the 
baseline model to include the new variable introduced in Section 2, defined as the lagged change in 
the share of HS06 products under WTO discipline – i.e., the share of products that are constrained by 
WTO maximum tariff limits because the applied tariff on a product is equal to its legal binding rate.26 
Again, we expect the IRR on this variable to be greater than 1, so that over time as more applied MFN 
tariffs become legally immovable in an upward direction, more of a country’s aggregate demand for 
new import protection pushes toward TTBs in response to economic shocks. The estimated IRR is 1.04 
and it is statistically significant. Furthermore, the rest of the estimated IRRs for the variables of 
interest in the estimation in column (2) are qualitatively unchanged. 
With these estimates in mind, next consider Figure 3 which presents additional information 
on the economic magnitudes of the effects. Results corresponding to the GATT era are represented by 
a solid grey bar (specification 2 in Table 4) and a horizontally striped bar (specification 4 in Table 4). 
The corresponding results for the WTO era are represented by a black bar (specification 2 of Table 4) 
and a vertically striped bar (specification 4 in Table 4). The first striking differences are seen in the 
impact of real currency appreciations. During the GATT period before 1995, a one standard deviation 
appreciation led to 12-33 percent fewer TTBs in the following year. This is a dramatic difference in 
comparison to the WTO period. Under the WTO, a one standard deviation appreciation of the 
bilateral real exchange rate led to a 23-31 percent increase in the number of TTBs imposed.  
The next group of bars in Figure 3 indicates that, prior to the WTO, weak real GDP growth or 
increases in the unemployment rate led to small declines in TTBs the following year. In sharp contrast, 
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 For the countries in the sample, almost 25 percent of all HS06 import products impacted by TTBs during this 
period targeted exports from China, during a period in which its mean annual real GDP growth rate was 10.09 
percent with a standard deviation of 1.90. 
 
26
 This variable is interacted with a binary indicator for the WTO period, under the assumption that this channel 
was not relevant during the GATT period when most emerging economies had not made significant legal binding 
commitments on their applied MFN tariffs. 
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a one standard deviation decline in real GDP growth (increase in the change in the domestic 
unemployment rate) under the WTO has been associated with a 25 percent (37 percent) increase in 
TTBs in the subsequent year.  
The third group of bars more precisely quantifies the results on trading partner growth. In 
particular, weak trading partner growth is quantitatively much less important under the WTO period. 
Finally, the last group of bars shows how commitments over MFN applied tariffs – or 
reductions in available policy space – help push countries toward utilizing TTB policies. As the share of 
products with binding tariff commitments increases by one standard deviation, the number of TTBs 
increases by 24 percent and 48 percent in specifications (2) and (4), respectively. While these results 
do indicate that countries are stepping away from the liberal trade regime and their promises to 
lower and bind their applied tariffs, it also represents a commitment to abide by the WTO’s rules and 
use the WTO’s sanctioned policy tools of TTBs in response to economic shocks.  
 The rest of Table 4 presents a set of robustness checks and sensitivity analysis. First, in 
column (3) we modify the definition for the WTO tariff binding variable. Here we redefine the share of 
products under WTO discipline so that any HS-06 product with an applied import tariff within 10 
percentage points of its tariff binding is “under WTO discipline,” a less restrictive condition than 
considering only products with applied tariffs equal to the binding. Use of this alternative measure 
has only a small impact on the size of the estimated IRRs.  
In column (4), we employ our alternative measure for the health of the domestic economy, 
substituting the lagged change in the domestic unemployment rate for domestic real GDP growth. 
The results are consistent with those obtained earlier – i.e., in the GATT period, the estimated IRR is 
less than one (though not significant) indicating that periods of lower unemployment were associated 
with heightened import protection through TTBs. While the differential between these two estimated 
IRRs is not statistically significant in this sample of data, part of this is likely explained by the poorer 
quality of unemployment data during the early period, in terms of how accurately such measures 
captured the health of the domestic economy, given the role of the informal sector.27 Furthermore, 
because the sample of countries for which the unemployment data is available at all is significantly 
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 Even for emerging economies with available unemployment rate data included in the sample, the argument is 
that unemployment rate itself may be becoming a more accurate and representative indicator for the overall 
health of the domestic economy over time due to the role that the informal sector plays in many countries. I.e., 
unemployment rate data for these countries may be noisier earlier in the sample if there is a general upward 
trend in formality within a country over time.  
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reduced, in column (5) we rerun our preferred model specification (of column 2) but with the same 
restricted subsample of data underlying the results in column (4). The basic results hold, indicating 
that the estimates are not sensitive to dropping major policy-imposing countries such as India and 
China from the sample due to the lack of unemployment data for this period.  
Finally, in specification (6) we again estimate our preferred specification of the model, but in 
this case we only include the subsample of major G20 emerging economies. In each instance, the 
qualitative pattern of the results holds.  
 
6 Conclusion 
Many emerging economies now exceed high income economies in the frequency and intensity of 
their application of the import-restricting antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing duty policies – 
collectively referred to as temporary trade barriers (TTBs). This paper investigates the impact of 
macroeconomic shocks on these trade policies for thirteen emerging economies between 1989 and 
2010. We provide evidence of a general counter-cyclical relationship for the period 1995-2010 under 
the WTO. We also provide evidence on changes to these empirical relationships relative to the pre-
WTO period; i.e., emerging economy import protection through TTBs became more counter-cyclical 
and sensitive to real exchange rate shocks over time.  
Our approach allows us to examine not only the impact of the WTO institution on aggregate-
level channels for new import protection, but we also explicitly address the separate role played by 
WTO disciplines on a country’s access to other trade policies such as applied MFN import tariffs. For 
these emerging economies, we find that an increase in the share of a country’s imported products 
that become subject to WTO disciplines results in significantly more products facing import protection 
through TTBs. Nevertheless, our aggregate-level evidence on trade policy substitutability between 
applied import tariffs and application of TTBs does not fully resolve the question of why many 
emerging economies use TTBs to respond to economic shocks despite the significant “water” that 
remains in their tariff bindings.  Some of these countries retain considerable freedom under the WTO 
to raise applied MFN tariffs, and yet they frequently respond to aggregate-level shocks with more 
discriminatory, trading partner-specific TTBs such as antidumping. These puzzles merit further micro-
oriented theoretical and empirical research. 
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Appendix: Data Description 
 
Antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing duty policy data at the Harmonized System 6-digit level 
by trading partner for 1995-2010 is compiled by the authors from the World Bank’s Temporary Trade 
Barriers Database (Bown, 2012b) which is publicly available at http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/ .  
 
Bilateral real exchange rate series come from the USDA’s Agricultural Exchange Rate Dataset. For 
each observation we use the value as of the last month of the year.  
 
Real GDP growth series comes from IMF’s IFS series with the exception of the European Union. For 
the European Union, we use the OECD’s real GDP series for the EU-15.  
 
Domestic unemployment rate change is constructed with data from the International Labor 
Organization. 
 
WTO disciplines over tariff come from 6-digit Harmonized System tariff data (simple averages) by 
country from TRAINS and WTO.  
 
Trading Partners: For each of the thirteen policy-imposing economies, we start with the 20 trading 
partners that are the most frequent targets against which each economy used TTBs over the sample 
period. From there, we include all of the top 20 trading partners for which we have quality 
macroeconomic data. This reduces the number of included partners to between 10 and 14. The 
reported information on percent of imports is based on non-oil imports during the 1995-2010 period. 
The trading partners for each policy-imposing economy used in the sample are: 
 Argentina (14): Australia, Brazil, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Paraguay, 
Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, Thailand, United States. These economies were 
the source of 85 percent of imports.  
 Brazil (13): Argentina, Chile, China, European Union, India, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, South 
Africa, South Korea, Thailand, United States. These economies were the source of 84 percent of 
imports.  
 China (10): European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, 
Thailand, United States. These economies were the source of 67 percent of imports.  
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 Colombia (12): Brazil, China, European Union, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, 
South Korea, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Venezuela. These economies were the source of 
75 percent of imports. 
 India (13): Canada, China, European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, United States. These economies were the source 
of 69 percent of imports.  
 Indonesia (11): Australia, China, European Union, India, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, South 
Korea, Thailand, Turkey. These economies were the source of 74 percent of imports.  
 Malaysia (12): Australia, Canada, China, European Union, Hong Kong, China; India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, United States. These economies were the source of 77 
percent of imports.  
 Mexico (12): Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, European Union, Hong Kong, China; 
Japan, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, United States. These economies were the source of 91 
percent of imports.  
 Peru (12): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, European Union, India, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Russia, United States. These economies were the source of 77 percent of imports.  
 Philippines (8): China, European Union, Hong Kong, China; Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, South 
Korea, Thailand. These economies were the source of 38 percent of imports.  
 South Africa (13): Australia, Brazil, China, European Union, Hong Kong, China; India, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, United States. These economies were the source 
of 78 percent of imports.  
 Thailand (11): Argentina, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, South 
Africa, South Korea, Venezuela. These economies were the source of 65 percent of imports.  
 Turkey (13): China, Egypt, European Union, Hong Kong, China; India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Thailand. These economies were the source of 73 
percent of imports.  
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Table 1: Temporary Trade Barriers and WTO Disciplines over MFN Tariffs 
Economy 
MFN tariff 
binding 
coverage 
under WTO 
(1) 
Average 
bound MFN 
tariff rate 
under WTO 
(2) 
Average 
applied 
MFN tariff 
rate in 
1995* 
(3) 
Average 
applied MFN 
tariff rate in 
2010 
(4) 
TTB import 
product 
coverage  
in 1995 
(5) 
TTB import 
product 
coverage  
in 2010 
(6) 
Year of 
first TTB in 
our 
estimation 
(7) 
Share of 
products with 
imposed TTBs 
under WTO 
discipline, 
1995-2010 
(8) 
Share of 
products with 
new TTB 
imposed 
under WTO 
discipline, 
1995-2010 
(9) 
Share of 
products with 
no new TTB 
imposed 
under WTO 
discipline, 
1995-2010 
(10) 
Emerging economy G20 members in sample     
Argentina 100.0 31.9 12.1 12.5 1.3 3.3 1989 18.3 20.2 15.3 
Brazil 100.0 31.4 13.0 13.7 0.4 1.6 1989 39.4 27.3 17.6 
China 100.0 10.0 15.9 9.6 0.0 1.4 1997 76.8 67.9 67.3 
India 73.8 49.4 14.5 12.4 0.2 6.6 1992 55.4 49.4 30.1 
Indonesia 95.8 37.2 15.3 6.7 0.0 0.6 1996 12.0 12.7 8.4 
Mexico 100.0 35.0 13.1 8.9 24.1 1.2 1989 3.8 9.0 8.1 
South Africa 96.6 19.2 14.2 7.6 0.4 0.6 1992 77.4 78.1 63.0 
Turkey 50.4 28.5 9.4 9.9 0.7 6.9 1989 3.7 4.4 25.6 
Emerging economy non-G20 members in sample     
Colombia 100.0 42.9 13.7 12.5 0.1 0.8 1991 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Malaysia 84.3 14.6 8.1 7.0 0.0 0.1 1996 24.9 32.7 69.1 
Peru 100.0 30.1 16.5 5.4 0.2 2.5 1992 27.0 37.1 12.9 
Philippines 67.0 25.7 20.3 6.3 0.0 0.2 1994 11.1 10.0 19.1 
Thailand 75.0 25.7 23.1 9.7 0.0 0.5 1996 0.0 32.6 27.9 
Source: All data computed from the HS-06 level. Column (1) is from WTO (2011), columns (2), (3), and (4) are calculated by the authors from WITS, columns (5) and 
(6) are from Bown (2012a). Columns (8), (9) and (10) calculated by the authors for each year, 1995-2010, and then time-averaged; note that ‘under WTO discipline’ is 
defined as products for which the applied MFN tariff rate is no more than 10 percentage points lower than the binding. Column (8) is the average over 1995-2010 of 
the share of all newly imposed TTBs in year t that are under WTO discipline in year t.  Column (9) is the share of products with a new TTB imposed in year t+1 that is 
under WTO discipline in year t.  Column (10) is the share of products with no new TTB imposed at t+1 that is under WTO discipline in year t. All countries joined the 
WTO in 1995 except China (2001). *Tariff year data for China is 2001, its year of WTO accession, whereas tariff year data for economies such as Malaysia (1996), 
South Africa (1996), and India (1997) is the first year available after 1995.  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Full sample of  
13 emerging economies 
G20 emerging  
economies only 
Variables 1995-2010 1989-1994 1995-2010 1989-1994 
     
Dependent Variables     
Bilateral (ij) count of products initiated 
under all temporary trade barrier (TTB) 
policies in year t that result in import 
protection (products per year per trading 
partner 
2.52 0.88 3.39 1.01 
(8.69) (3.26) (9.86) (3.57) 
Bilateral (ij) count of products initiated 
under all temporary trade barrier (TTB) 
policies in year t  (products per year per 
trading partner) 
5.26 3.14 4.88 3.74 
(23.39) (12.70) (11.68) (13.95) 
Bilateral (ij) count of products initiated 
under antidumping (AD) policies in year t 
that result in import protection (products 
per year per trading partner) * 
1.66 0.91 1.69 1.05 
(5.70) (3.35) (5.87) (3.68) 
Explanatory Variables     
Percent change in bilateral real exchange 
rate ijt-1 
1.39 13.71 1.62 15.78 
(18.35) (65.84) (19.66) (71.79) 
Domestic real GDP growth jt-1 4.50 3.66 4.42 3.76 
(4.28) (3.86) (4.39) (4.16) 
Change in domestic unemployment rate   jt-
1* 
0.07
 
0.23 0.04
 
0.37 
(1.46) (1.12) (1.68) (1.06) 
Real GDP growth of trading partner it-1 4.17 4.98 4.09 4.87 
(4.17) (4.09) (4.03) (4.09) 
Bilateral import growth from trading 
partner ijt-1 
6.74 0.95 10.25 0.92 
(91.87) (5.69) (113.86) (6.15) 
Change in the share of imported products 
under WTO discipline jt-1* 
-1.05 -- -0.80 -- 
(6.08)  (4.45)  
      
Observations 2373 459 1541 377 
Notes: Sample means reported with standard deviations in parentheses. *Summary statistics for these 
variables based on fewer observations than listed, exact amount depending on subsample. (The subsample 
difference explains why for the 1989-1994 period the average count of products subject to AD alone is 
greater than the average count of products subject to all TTBs.) 
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Table 3: Negative Binomial Model Estimates of Determinants of Import Protection, 1995-2010 
 
Dependent variable: Bilateral (ij) count of products initiated under all temporary trade barrier (TTB) policies 
in year t that result in import protection 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Baseline 
specification 
Substitute 
domestic un-
employment 
Modify 
country 
indicators 
Drop 
import 
growth 
Redefine 
dependent 
variable to 
AD only 
Redefine 
dependent 
variable to all 
TTB 
investigations 
G20 
emerging 
economies 
only 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Percent change in bilateral real exchange rate ijt-1 1.01
b
 1.01
b
 1.01
b
 1.01
b
 1.01
b
 1.01
c
 1.01
b
 
(2.30) (2.10) (2.04) (2.25) (2.30) (1.69) (2.00) 
Domestic real GDP growth jt-1 0.94
a
 -- 0.96
b
 0.94
a
 0.92
a
 0.93
a
 0.93
a
 
(3.56)  (2.35) (3.60) (4.26) (4.37) (3.56) 
Domestic unemployment rate change jt-1 -- 1.20
a
 -- -- -- -- -- 
 (2.85)      
Real GDP growth of trading partner it-1 0.97
c
 0.98 0.97
c
 0.96
c
 1.01 0.97
c
 0.98 
(1.86) (0.65) (1.79) (1.94) (0.54) (1.86) (1.19) 
Bilateral import growth from trading partner ijt-1 1.00 1.15 1.00 -- 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.95) (0.57) (0.22)  (1.21) (0.72) (0.99) 
Time trend 1.02 0.97 1.01 1.02 0.97
b
 1.06
a
 1.03
c
 
(1.62) (1.04) (0.41) (1.57) (2.09) (3.95) (1.83) 
Indicator that exporter is China* -- -- 9.09
 a
 -- -- -- -- 
  (5.26)     
Importer-exporter combined fixed effects yes yes no yes yes yes yes 
Separate importer and exporter fixed effects no no yes no no no no 
Observations 2,373 1,393 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 1,541 
Notes: Policy-imposing countries j vis-à-vis one of the trading partners i (listed in the Appendix) over 1995-2010. Explanatory variables are each lagged 
one year (at t-1). Incidence Rate Ratios (IRRs) are reported in lieu of coefficient estimates, with t-statistics in parentheses. Model includes a constant term 
whose estimate is suppressed. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
AD=antidumping. *Excluded exporter fixed effect is for the median country by total products targeted by all policy-imposing countries in the sample 
during 1995-2010, which was Australia. 
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Table 4: The Impact of the WTO Agreement on Time-Varying Import Protection 
 
Dependent variable: Bilateral (ij) count of products initiated under all temporary  
trade barrier (TTB) policies in year t that result in import protection 
 
 
Baseline 
Add tariff 
variable 
Change 
definition  
of tariff 
variable 
Substitute 
unemploy-
ment rate 
change 
Real GDP 
on same 
subsample 
as (4)  
G20 
only 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Percent change in bilateral real 
exchange rate  ijt-1 x GATT 
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
c
 0.99 0.99 
(0.86) (0.83) (0.84) (1.91) (1.09) (0.45) 
Percent change in bilateral real 
exchange rate  ijt-1 x WTO 
1.01
a
 1.01
a
 1.01
a
 1.01
b
 1.01
c
 1.01
b
 
(2.75) (2.77) (2.65) (2.06) (1.80) (2.41) 
  [Test statistic] [7.99]
a 
[8.01]
a
 [7.44]
b
 [6.57]
a
 [4.21]
b
 [5.54]
b
 
Domestic economy jt-1 x GATT 1.05 1.05 1.05 0.94 1.15
a
 1.06 
(1.11) (1.15) (1.14) (0.29) (2.30) (1.47) 
Domestic economy jt-1 x WTO 0.95
a
 0.95
a
 0.95
a
 1.24
a
 0.94
b
 0.95
a
 
(2.96) (2.97) (2.83) (3.44) (2.03) (2.59) 
  [Test statistic] [4.72]
b 
[4.88]
b
 [4.62]
b
 [1.57] [8.62]
a
 [6.17]
b
 
Real GDP growth of trading partner 
  it-1 x GATT 
0.85
a
 0.85
a
 0.85
a
 0.85
b
 0.88
c
 0.85
a
 
(4.12) (4.09) (4.11) (2.54) (1.88) (4.03) 
Real GDP growth of trading partner 
  it-1 x WTO 
0.96
b
 0.97
c
 0.97
 c
 0.99 1.00 0.97 
(1.98) (1.70) (1.81) (0.19) (0.07) (1.37) 
  [Test statistic] [9.99]
a 
[10.64]
a
 [10.41]
a
 [6.00]
b
 [3.70]
c
 [10.90]
a
 
Import growth from trading partner 
  ijt-1 x GATT 
0.89 0.89 0.89 0.81 0.73 0.87 
(1.13) (1.11) (1.13) (1.39) (1.57) (1.28) 
Import growth from trading partner 
  ijt-1 x WTO 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.21 1.18 1.00 
(1.04) (1.02) (1.06) (0.79) (0.65) (1.04) 
  [Test statistic] [1.28]
 
[1.25] [1.28] [2.01] [2.22] [1.65] 
WTO 1.84
c
 1.92
c
 1.83
c
 0.98 3.78
b
 2.39
b
 
(1.67) (1.80) (1.66) (0.03) (2.32) (2.38) 
Change in the share of imported 
products under WTO discipline jt-1 
x WTO 
-- 1.04
a
 1.03
a
 1.07
a
 1.06
a
 1.03 
 
(3.24) (2.71) (2.94) (2.61) (1.60) 
Time trend included yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Import and exporter combined fixed 
effects 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,777 2,777 2,777 1,633 1,633 1,863 
Notes: Policy-imposing countries j vis-à-vis one of the trading partners i (listed in the Appendix) over 1989-2010. 
Explanatory variables are each lagged one year (at t-1). The domestic economy variable is defined as the lagged 
change in domestic real GDP growth in all columns except (4) in which it is defined as the lagged change in the 
domestic unemployment rate. Incidence Rate Ratios (IRRs) are reported in lieu of coefficient estimates, with t-
statistics in parentheses. Each model includes a constant term whose estimates are suppressed. Superscripts a, 
b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The 
notation x GATT indicates that a dummy for the GATT years (1994 and earlier) is turned on, whereas x WTO 
indicates that a dummy for the WTO years (1995-2010) is turned on. 
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Figure 1: Changes to WTO Disciplines over Emerging Economy Applied Tariffs, 1996-2010 
 
 
ARG
ARG ARGARG ARG ARG
ARG
ARG ARGARG ARGARGARG
ARG
ARG
B A B A BRA BRA B A BRAB ABRA
BRA
B A
BRA
BRA
BRA
B A B A
CHN
CHN
CHN CHN
CHN CHNCHN
CHN
CHN
COLCOL COLCOL COLCOL COL COLOLCOL COLCOL COL COL COL
IND
IND
IND
INDIND
IND
IND
IND
IND
IDNIDN
IDN
IDNIDN IDN IDNIDN IDNIDNIDNIDN IDN MYSMYS MYS
MYS MYS MYS
MYS
MYS
MYS
EX EX MEXEXMEX MEXEX MEXMEX
MEX
MEX MEX MEX
PER
P RP R PER P RP R PERP R
PER
P RP RP R P R
PHL
PHLP LHL
PHL
PH H
PHL
H H H
PHL
PHL H ZAF
ZAF
ZAF
ZAF
ZAF
ZAFZAFZAF
ZAF
ZAF
ZAF
THA
THA
T
THA
THA
T THA TURUR
TUR
TUR
TU
TUR
TUR
TURTUR TU TU
TUR
TUR TUTU
-3
0
-2
0
-1
0
0
1
0
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
Change in
the percent
of products at
WTO maximum
tariff rate
 
 
Notes: Constructed by the authors from WTO (2011) and WITS. For scaling purposes, one observation for 
Thailand of -60 percent in 2000 is omitted from the figure; this observation is included in the empirical analysis.  
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Figure 2: Temporary Trade Barrier Responsiveness to Macroeconomic Shocks, 1995-2010 
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Notes: Percent change in HS-06 products subject to new import protection per year per trading partner. 
Based on Table 3 model estimates with specifications given in parentheses, and a one standard deviation 
change in each explanatory variable away from the sample mean, holding all other variables constant. 
Models (1), (5), (6), and (7) are estimated using the lagged domestic real GDP growth rate as the negative 
shock to the domestic economy, whereas as model (2) is estimated using the lagged change in the level of 
the domestic unemployment rate. 
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Figure 3: TTB Import Protection and Macroeconomic Shocks during the GATT versus WTO Periods 
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Notes: Percent increase in HS-06 products subject to new import protection per year per trading partner, based 
on Table 4 model estimates of specifications (2) and (4). In each case the approach is to use a one standard 
deviation change in each explanatory variable away from the sample mean, holding all other variables constant, 
where the mean and subsample are defined on the relevant subsample of years. *Variable only relevant for the 
WTO period. 
 
 
 
